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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERLY
And THE BAR
VOLUME XXV JANUARY, 1918 Numma 2
GOING VALUE AS VALUE FOR PURPOSES
OF RATE REGULATION
By THOMAS PORTER HARDMAN*
T HE recent wide-spread demand on the part of many public
tLies to be allowed to increase their rates has made of com-
pelling importance the much disputed question, when or to what
extent the "going value" of a public utility is value for purposes
of rate regulation. Perhaps no problem of importance in the
whole field of law is the subject of more confusion or contrariety
of opinion. The question arises, or may be raised, in practically
every case of rate regulation. The "going value" of the enter-
prise usually amounts to a very considerable sum, often to hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars. Yet the courts and commissions
have so far failed to settle upon any definite rule as to when or to
what extent, if any, this value constitutes a part of the value upon
which the utility is entitled to earn a fair return.
Some courts and commissions, while admitting that a utility
has an added element of value vaguely called "going value," re-
fuse to make any allowance for such value in rate-making cases.,
Other authorities expressly allow a definite sum for this element of
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 Consolidated Gas Co. v. City of New York, 157 Fed. 849 ; Cedar Rapids Water
Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 118 Ia. 234, 91 N. W. 1081, sed cf. Cedar Rapids Gas
Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 144 Ia. 426, 120 N. W. 966; Contra Costa Water Co. V. City
of Oakland, 159 Cal. 323, 113 Pac. 668. For an extended citation of authorities
pro and con, and for a fuller citation of authorities on notes 2, 3 and 4, infra, see
1 WmTTEN, VALUATION Or PUBLIC SERvlcE CORPORATIONS, §§ 550-644, 2 ibid., J§
1350-1885.
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value.2  Others allow "something" for "going value"--at least
they say they do--but refuse to allow any definite or separate
sum." And, to add chaos to confusion, some authorities allow
something sometimes, and sometimes not, but (and this applies
to many authorities) When and to what extent are left largely
matters of mystery.4 In the latest ruling on the question by the
United States Supreme Court it was held that "going value" is
"a property right and should be considered in determining the
value of the property upon which the owner has a right to make
a fair return." This holding, it might reasonably be supposed,
had practically settled the whole conflict; for, inasmuch as the
United States Supreme Court is, under the Constitution, the court
of last resort upon the question of valuation for purposes of rate
regulation, i. e., regulation by statute or commission,8 it would be
supposed that other tribunals would follow the Supreme Court
upon this question. On the contrary, however, there has been a
tendency on the part of many authorities either to disregard, or
to construe away, the apparent effect of the Supreme Court's
decision.
A typical illustration of this tendency is the rather recent de-
cision of the West Virginia Public Service Commission in the case
of In re Clarksburg Light and Heat Company.7- In that case the
"going value" of the plant, estimated at $360,000, was excluded
by the commission on the ground that the "history of the com-
pany clearly shows that it suffered no losses." The theory of the
2 Public Service Gas Co. -v. Board of Commissioners, 89 N. J. L. 463, 87 Atl.
-651; People v. Willcox, 210 N. Y. 479, 104 N. E. 911; Venner Co. v. Urbana Water-
works Co., 174 Fed. 348; Peck v. Indianapolis Light & Heat Co., (Ind. P. S. C.) P.
U. R. 1916B, 445; Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1 (semble).
3Appleton Waterworks Co. v. Railroad Commission, 154 Wis. 121, 142 N. W.
476; Thomas v. Jefferson City Light, Heat, etc. Co., (Mo. P. S. C.) P. U. R. 1917B,
745; Re Pauhuska Oil & Gas Co., (Okla. Corporation Commission) P. U. R. 1917D,
957; Bluefleld v. Bluefield Waterworks, etc. Co., W. Va. P. S. C.. Case No. 58, P.
U. R. 1917E, 22; In re The W. Va. Traction & Electric Co., W. Va. P. S. C., Case
No. 568. See Cedar Rapids Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids, supra; In re Clarksburg
Light & Heat Co., W. Va. P. S. C., Case No. 415, P. U. R. 1917A, 577.
' Cedar Rapids Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 144 Ia. 426, 12( N. W. 966, but see
Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 118 Ia. 234, 91 N. W. 1081; Bly V. Win-
slow Electric Light & Power Co., (Ariz. Corporation Commission) P. U. R. 1916A.
22, but see Municipal League of Phoenix v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., (Ariz. Cor-
poration Commission) 21 A. Tel. & Tel. Co. Leaflets 699; In re West Virginia Trac-
tion & Electric Co., W. Va. P. S. C., Case No. 568, but see In ,e Clarksburg Light
& Heat Co., W. Va. P. S. C., Case No. 415, P. U. R. 1917A, 577.
'Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, .238 U. S. 153.
0 Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Commissioners, supra. See BEALE & WYMAN,
RAILmOAD RAT REGULATION, 2 ed., §§ 273, 274.
1W. Va. P. S. C., Case No. 415, P. U. R. 1917A, 577.
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commission seems to be that of a New York ease upon which the
commission places much reliance,' viz., that "going value" is made
up only of uncompensated losses of the earlier years; and that if
such losses have been offset by subsequent profits in excess of a
fair return, then there is no "going value." Shnilar rulings have
been recently made by the Supreme Court of California in the
ease of San Joaquin Light & Power Corporation v. Railroad Com-
mission," by the Maine Public Utilities Commission in the case of
Rich v. Biddeford & Soco Water Company" and- by several other
commissions."' As these recent cases are subsequent to the above-
mentioned United States Supreme Court decision, which is appar-
ently contra, and as some of these cases expressly rely upon that
decision as a justification for their conclusions, the important ques-
tion thus raised is whether "going value" under the Supreme
Court doctrine depends in whole or in part upon the continued
existence of past deficits.
In order to answer this question adequately it will first be nec-
essary to determine definitely just what "going value" is, for it
seems that the whole conflict and confusion on the subject is due
fundamentally to a failure to analyze the "elusive, intangible
and troublesome thing" in question. What then is "going value,"
and when or to what extent, if at all, should it be included as a
proper part of the value upon which a public utility should be
allowed to earn a reasonable return?
First, what is "going value"? As was pointed out in one of
the latest cases,12 "experts, courts and commissions" do not agree
as to what this "troublesome" thing is. "Some define it as one
thing, some another." Now, so long as courts and commissions
do not agree even as to what they are arguing about, it is, of
course, impossible for them to arrive consistently at harmonious
or sound conclusions. Hence, it is necessary at the outset to settle
upon some definite meaning as the proper meaning of "going
8People v. Willcox, supra. See further, as to the New York view, Herman v.
Newton Gas Co., (N. Y. P. S. C. 1st Dist.) P. U. R. 1916D, 825.
9 165 Pac. 16, P. U. R. 1917E, 37. For a complete understanding of this trou-
blesome decision, see the case before the commission, East Bakersfield, etc. Asso-
ciation v. San Joaquin, etc. Corporation, (Cal. R. C.) P. U. R. 1916C, 380.
'OP. U. R. 1917C, 982.
"E. g., Moritz v. Edison Electric Illuminating Co., (N. Y. P. S. C., 1st Dist.) Case
No. 1540, P. U. R. 1917A, 364; City of Sparta v. Monroe Telephone Co., (Wis. R.
C.) P. U. R. 1917C, 507; Roundup v. Roundup, etc. Co., (Mont. P. S. C.) P. U. R.
1916D, 393.
"Re Indianapolis Water Co., (Ind. P. S. C.) P. U. R. 1917B, 556.
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value" for purposes of rate regulation; and fortunately the
United States Supreme Court, in the above-mentioned case, has
supplied a definition which sufficiently expresses the general prin-
ciple involved. "Going value" that court defines as "the value
which inheres in a plant where its business is established as dis-
tinguished from one which has yet to establish its business."' 13
To express the idea more fully, "going value" may be defined as
the difference between the value of a plant valued as a whole in
its present condition and the sum of the values of the various com-
ponent parts of the plant, considered and valued as a "non-going"
or static plant with its business and operating system yet to es-
tablish. It is indisputable that this difference-this "going-con-
cern" element-is a thing of value; but is it, in all cases and to
its full extent, value upon which a public utility is entitled to base
its rates? To begin with, just what does this intangible element
of value really represent? It is the present representative of the
money or money's worth spent in transforming the static "bare
bones" of the plant into the present "going" concern with its
established business. Perhaps the best judicial exposition of the
nature of this item of value is the following excerpt from the
opinion of Miller, J., in the leading case of People v. Willcox:14
"What then, is 'going value' and how is it to be appraised?
"It takes time to put a new enterprise of any magnitude
on its feet, after the construction work has been finished.
Mistakes of construction have to be corrected. Substitutions
have to be made. Economies have to be studied. Experi-
ments have to be made, which sometimes turn out to be use-
less. An organization has to be perfected. Business has to be
solicited and advertised for. In the case of a gas company,
gratuitous work has to be done, such as selling appliances at
less than a fair profit and demonstrating new devices to in-
duce consumption of gas and to educate the public up to the
maximum point of consumption. None of those things is
reflected in the value of the physical property, unless, of
course, exchange value be taken, which is not admissible in
a rate case. The company starts out with the 'bare bones'
of the plant, to borrow Mr. Justice Lurton's phrase in Omaha
Waterworks case, supra. By the expenditure of time, labor
and money it co-ordinates those bones into an efficient work-
Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra, 165. For other definitions
of "going value" see WYER, REGULATION. VALUATION AND DEPRECIATION OF PUBLIC
UTILITiES, §§ 536, 555; 1 WmIXTEN, Op Cit., §§ 636, 580 et seq.
14210 N. Y. 479, 486, 104 N. E. 911.
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ing organism and acquires a paying business. The proper
and reasonable cost of doing that, whether included in oper-
ating expenses or not, is as much a part of the investment of
the company as the cost of the physical property."
It is clear, then, that this "going-concern" element has cost
money or money's equivalent. Hence, it is clear that the utility
must in some manner be compensated for this expenditure. But
how? Is the whole value of this "going-concern" element value
upon which the utility may perpetually charge rates? First, it has
been argued that those portions of wages of employes which have
gone toward creating this item of value must not, if they have al-
ready been charged to operating expenses, be also represented in
value for purposes of rate regulation; for those wages, having
been charged to operating expenses, cannot, of course, be charged
also to capital account. This argument, however, as will subse-
quently appear, cannot be supported. 1" Besides, it is largely brain
work (knowledge derived from experience, which is proverbially
expensive) that created this item of value; and the value of much
of this work is frequently not the result of wages charged to oper-
ating expenses. Furthermore, as will appear later, things of value
other than work have gone toward creating this "going-concern"
element. Second, it must be observed, that under the prevailing
doctrine, which for the time being is assumed to be the correct doc-
trine, the value of a plant for rate-making purposes is not the ac-
tual cost of constructing the plant but the properly determined
"present value" of the plant."6 Hence, if any part of "going
value" is ever value for rate purposes, it is not the actual cost,
but the present value, of that part of the "going-concern" element
thus created, that constitutes value for purposes of rate regulation.
Third, "good-will" value, though a part of "going value" as
above defined, is not a proper element of value in rate-making
cases. That point is settled law for the very good reason that,
since a public utility is monopolistic in nature, it would obviously
be improper to allow the utility to capitalize the value of its mo-
nopoly and base its rates upon such capitalization. 7 "Going
value," then, for purposes of rate regulation does not include
"good-will" value. The ultimate question in all eases, therefore,
35 See a discussion of this point in 27 HAnv. L. REv. 744, 745.
1, San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439; Public Service Gas Co.
v. Board of Commissioners, supra; see BEALE & WnsAx, op. cit., §§ 273, 274, 275.
17Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19; see BEALE & WYMAN, op. cit.,
§ 276.
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is, when or to what extent, if any, this remaining part of "going
value" is value for purposes of rate regulation.
It might seem, at first thought, that for rate-making purposes
there should also be deducted that cost of production which has been
charged to operating expense, and paid for from current revenues,
so that there would ordinarily be nothing left in this so-called
"going value." But such a result does not follow, for two rea-
sons. First, suppose for the sake of argument that in the particu-
lar case the whole of the prima facie expense of developing the
business (building up the operating system) has been properly
charged to operating expense and paid for from current revenues,
there is still an important difference between the value of the
static plant with its business yet to establish and the value of the
present plant with its business and operating system already estab-
lished, that is to say, a difference in value which is neither "good-
will" value nor the present representative of expenditures paid
for from current revenues. Thus, during the development period,
i. e., before a paying business is established, the rates charged by
a utility are not sufficient to pay operating expenses and also a
fair return upon the capital value of the plant. In other words
the investors must wait until a paying business is established be-
fore they begin to earn a fair return upon the value of the plant.
Now, after this unproductive period it is clear that the utility must
be allowed to charge rates which will coinpensate it for the use of
its capital during the unproductive period. Hence, the value of
the property with the business established is, as a general rule,
enhanced to the extent of a sum equivalent to the sum which the
unproductive capital invested would have earned at a fair profit
during the unproductive development period. Thus, suppose that
the proper capital value of a static plant is $1,000,000 and that
during the first year the plant pays only operating expenses. This
capital value, invested elsewhere, would have earned a fair return
of, say, six or eight per cent., viz., $60,000 or $80,000. This fair
return upon that capital, however, has in effect been invested in
creating the "going-concern" part of the plant, that is to say, it
is now "going value." The second reason why such a result does
not follow is that the actual cost of constructing a plant, and there-
fore the actual cost of constructing a part thereof, is not, by the
prevailing doctrine, the proper value thereof for purposes of rate
regulation.
This remaining part of going value, then, is an important part
6
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of the value of a plant: But, is it value for rate-making .purposes,
or, as the question is presented by these recent cases, does it, for
rate-making purposes, depend for its existence upon the existence
of past deficits? For the sake of convenience this'part of going
value will, unless otherwise indicated, be hereafter referred to
simply as going value.
In the first place, from the foregoing definition and analysis of
going value, it seems clear that this "going-concern" element-
this operating systen-when once it is created, is a continuous in-
strument of production, that is to say, it is not, like an operating ex-
pense, a mere temporary instrument of immediate return, but, like
capital expenditure, a permanent instrument of production, which
without further outlay, continues year after year to bring in its
annual return. Hence, going value possessing, as it does, this,
the distinguishing characteristic of capital expenditure, consti-
tutes, upon principle, a part of the capital value of the plant. In
the second place, it will be seen that the doctrine of these recent
cases allows this capital value to be wiped out by subsequent earn-
ings, for under that 'doctrine, if there are past deficits there is a
corresponding going value, i. e., capital value, but if there are no
past deficits, that is to say, if the earnings are sufficient to offset
the development cost, then there is no going value; in other words,
the going value which, as seen, is capital value, is then wiped out
by subsequent earnings. But if this capital value may be wiped
out by later earnings, then by the same reasoning all capital value
may be wiped out pro tanto by later earnings, and, therefore, if
a utility is allowed to charge sufficient excessive rates, the plant's
total capital value would be wiped out and the utility, having no
value for rate-making purposes, would have to serve the public
gratuitously-an absurd conclusion which would seem to estab-
lish the fallacy of the doctrine.
Upon this point the following observation of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission would seem to be entitled tb great weight:
"These assets [prior earnings] cannot, however, be consid-
ered in the fixing of a reasonable express rate. Even were it
true that these campanies had accumulated a surplus by the im-
position of charges which were, when made, unjust and un-
reasonable, this commission cannot undertake to distribute
that surplus to the public by putting into effect to-day rates
which are not fairly compensatory for the present selvice."1' 8
'8KIndell -v. Adams Express Co., 13 1. C. C. 475, 490.
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So, Rider, C., in the recent case of Bluefield v. Bluefield Water-
works & Improvement Company :19
"It could not be said in fairness to a utility, that it should
be deprived of a fair return on a proper valuation of its prop-
erty used in the public service at the present time because of
excessive earnings it may have realized in the past."
This argument as respects the capital value of physical property
would seem to be irrefutable. But certainly all capital value must
stand in this respect upon the same footing. It would seem,
therefore, that the above-mentioned part of going value is always
value for purposes of rate regulation, and that cases which
make going value depend in whole or in part upon the continued
existence of past deficits, or allow going value to be offset pro
tanto by subsequent earnings, proceed upon an erroneous theory
as to the fundamental nature of this item of value.
Upon principle, then, it would seem that these cases cannot be
supported.- But how about the authorities.? On this point, since
these cases often purport to follow the above-mentioned decision
of the United States Supreme Court,20 and since that court is
under the Constitution, the court of last resort on the question of
valuation for purposes of rate regulation, i. e., regulation by stat-
ute or commission, 21 it would seem unnecessary to go beyond that
decision if that decision is contra to these cases and at the same
time in accord with sound principle. First, is there anything in
the Supreme Court's opinion to support these recent cases? The
only, part of the opinion upon which any of these cases seem to rely
is the following (p. 165):
"Included in going value as usually reckoned is the invest-
ment necessary to organizing and establishing the business,
which is not embraced in the Value of its actual physical
property. In this case, what may be called the inception cost
of the enterprise entering into the, establishing of a going con-
cern had long since been incurred. The present company and
its predecessors had long carried on business in the City of
Des Moines, under other ordinances, and at higher rates than
the ordinance in question established. For aught that appears
in this record, these expenses ["overhead charges"] may
have been already compensated in rates charged and col-
10W. Va. P. S. C. Case No. 59., P. U. R. 1917E, 22, 32.
1 Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra.
21 See note 6, supra.
8
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1918], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol25/iss2/2
GOING- VALUE FOB BATE PURPOSES
lected under former ordinances.22  As we have said, every
presumption is in favor of the legitimate exercise of the rate-
making power, and it is not to be presumed, without proof,
that a company is under the necessity of making up losses and
expenditures incidental to the experimental stage of the
business.23
Does this passage, then, support cases which exclude going
value on the ground that there have been no losses, or that the
development cost has been offset by later earnings? In the first
place, these cases fail to notice that the Supreme Court, notwith-
standing its language, did not exclude these expenses but by neg-
ative inference approved the allowance of these expenses. In the
second place, this passage is only a dictum. In the third place, it
is interesting to note, though the point is more interesting than
important, that the Supreme Court in the above-quoted passage
was not dealing with going value at all, viz., going value as de-
fined by the court, but, to use the language of the court, was deal-
ing with an item of "going value as usually reckoned," viz.,
"overhead charges" which are "pre-6peration" expenses, and,
therefore, of course, not an item of technical going value, for these
expenses inhere in the plant before the plant starts business and,
therefore, before the plant can possibly have a going-concern
-value.24 The Supreme Court's decision, therefore, not only does
not support these recent cases, but is, so far as it goes, a decision
to the contrary, for there is nothing in the Supreme Court case to
show that the utility had not "received ample returns"' to offset
the development cost. In fact, the opinion expressly states
that the plant there in question was "a long established and suc-
cessful plant."125  In short, the plant was so successful that the
gas rates had been reduced by ordinance from $1.30 per thousand
to $1.00, and finally by the ordinance in question to 90 cents,28
and yet this final reduction was upheld by the United States Su-
preme Court in the case relied upon by some of these cases as jus-
tifying an exclusion of going value where the utility had so far
"received ample returns." Lastly, it will be recalled that the
United States Supreme Court held in that case that the "going
value" of such a plant "is a property right, and should be con-
= Italics ours.
sd.
Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra, 166-168. See BEAL.L & WY-
mAN, op. cit., §294.
NDes Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra, 171.
26See statement of the case in the lower court, 199 Fed. 204.
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sidered in determining the value of the property upon which the
owner has a right to make a fair return."27 Hence, since the Su-
preme Court's decision is, so far as it goes, contrary to these cases
and in accord with what would seem to be sound principle, it
would seem that these recent cases, are wholly without tenable sup-
port, and that the aforementioned part of going value is always
and to its full extent a proper element of value for rate-making
purposes.
Upon principle this conclusion seems quite clear if it'is once ad-
mitted that the present value of a plant is the basic value upon
which the utility must be allowed to earn a fair return. It must
be remembered, however, that present value is by no means the
universally accepted view as to the proper basic value for pur-
poses of rate regulation, for there are at least four widely diver-
sified views-all sanctioned by some authority-as to what is the
proper basic value upon which a public utility is entitled to real-
ize a reasonable return ;28 and it is undoubtedly to this conflict
and confusion that much of the conflict and confusion as to going
value must be attributed. Thus, some courts and commissions
hold that the cost of reproducing the plant in its present condition
at present prices is the proper basic value for rate-making pur-
poses ;21 others insist that the original cost of the plant must be
taken as the basis;30 some say that the outstanding capitalization
is the proper valuation ; 1 while the prevailing view is that the
present value of the plant is the proper value, and that any regu-
lation of rates by statute or commission that prevents the utility
from realizing a reasonable return upon that value is confiscatory
and unconstitutional. 2
It is not primarily within the purview of this article to discuss
these various theories and for that reason it has been thus far
assumed that present value is the proper value. But as many
27 Italics ours.
2s See BEALE & WYMAN, op. cit., § 251; POND, PUBLIc UTILITIES, § 477.
2For a citation of authorities and general discussion of this view, see BEALr.
& WYMAN, op. cit., §§ 285-296.
30Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 67 S. E. 613 (the "amount of
money" actually and properly "invested"). For a further citation of authorities and
a general discussion of this view, see 2 WYMAN, PUBLIC SERviCE COPoRTioNs, §§
1081-1090.
"For a citation of authorities and discussion of this view, see 2 WYMAN, op. cit.,
§§ 1091-1098.
32San Diego Land, etc. Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439; Public Service Gas Co.
v. Board of Commissioners, supra. See BEALE & WYMAN, op. cit., § § 273, 274, 275;
WYMAN, op. Cit., §§ 1099, 1100.
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courts and commissions do not accept this view, it is, therefore,
necessary in passing to dispose of this point, for it is obvious that
the question, to what extent, if any, going value is a proper part
of capital value, depends altogether upon what is taken to be the
proper basis of capital value. Thus, if outstanding capitalization
is taken as the proper capital value, clearly going value would not
be a necessary part of that basic value. So if original cost is
taken as the proper basic value, going value is not necessarily
represented in original cost, as that cost is often calculated."
Likewise cost of reproduction in present condition at present prices
does not necessarily include a full measure of going value. From
the very nature of going value it is, as a rule, fully represented
only in present value, though, of course, it is, or may be, very ex-
tensively represented in reproduction cost, and to some extent
perhaps in other basic values.84 It follows, therefore, that if any
basic value other than present value is adopted, e. g., a combina-
tion of present value and any other value or values, then going
value is or is not an element or to some extent an element of cap-
ital value, depending upon the basic value chosen as the proper
basis of capitalization. All this may seem somewhat beside the
point. Its significance, however, will clearly appear upon an ex-
amination of the way in which the question is often dealt with by
courts and commissions; and perhaps there is no better case for
illustrative purposes than the very recent decision of the West
Virginia Public Service Commission in the case of In re The West
Virginia Traction & Electric Company35 The language there
used by the commission in arriving at its conclusion is as follows:
"In arriving at the value of the different items constituting
applicant's plant, we have, among other evidences or elements
of value, considered the original cost, reproduction cost, and
present value, and under the great weight of authorities it is,
proper to allow in a case of this character something for
going value, organization expenses, etc. In fixing the value of
many of the items constituting said -plant, the fact that
same was a going concern was taken into consideration and
due allowance made therefor. In this particular case, the
Commission feels that it would not be improper to allow
7 per cent. on the value of said property thus found by it,
=See, e.g., the method of calculating original cost adopted in Coal & Coke Ry.
Co. v. Conley, supra.
34 Of. POND, op. cit., §§ 474, 487, 489.
3W. Va. P. S. C., Case No. 568.
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or about $59,700.00, to cover omissions, emergencies, superin-
tendence, etc., usually termed 'overhead expenses,' making the
total value of said property on which to pay a return about
$853,000.00.' 6
This holding suggests several interesting and important ques-
tions: First, to what extent is such a decision inconsistent with the
conclusions reached in the other recent cases under consideration,
for there is nothing in the ease to show that the utility has not
in the past received ample returns? The answer to this question
will sufficiently appear in answering the next two questions.
Second, the commission states that "in fixing the value of many
of the items constituting said plant the fact that the same was a
going concern was taken into consideration and due allowance
made therefor.'' But what is "due allowance?" The ease does
not purport to overrule the principal case, In re Clarksburg Light
& Heat' Company, supra, and by the doctrine of the principal case
it would seem that "due allowance" would be nothing if the util-
ity had "suffered no losses" or its losses had been recouped from
later earnings. At any rate there was no separate allowance made
for "going value" and it does not appear whether the "due al-
lowance" was one hundred dollars or one hundred thousand dol-
lars. Hence, the second question raised by such a decision is this:
Should there be a separate allowance for going value so that,
among other reasons, an appellate court may readily determine
whether there was a proper allowance for this "property right."
This question for purposes of convenience will be answered after
the next. Third-and this is the question with which we are im-
mediately concerned--an the basic value here chosen be justified?
As to the latter question, it will be seen that the basic value adopted
is a composite value arrived at by expressly adopting several dis-
tinct theories as to the proper basic value, viz., [1] "original cost,
[2] reproduction cost and [3] present value," and also, to use
the language of the commission, "other evidences or elements of
value." 88  Now, to what extent is going value, as above defined,
a part of this composite basic value? It would seem to be im-
possible to answer the question categorically, for it does not ap-
pear in what proportions these various theories of valuation are
represented in this composite basic value, and, as already pointed
N Italics ours.
877d.
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out, whether or to what extent going value is capital value de-
pends altogether upon the basic value adopted as the proper cap-
ital value for rate-making purposes. Nor. is the West Virginia
Commission alone in taking such a position. It has the distin-
guished company of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the leading case of Smyth v. Ames.3 9  In that case Mr. Justice
Harlan, speaking for the court, used the following much-quoted
and much-misapplied language:
"We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as to the
reasonableness of rate to be charged ........ .. must be
the fair value of the property being used ........ .. for
the convenience of the public. And to ascertain this value,
the original cost of construction, the amount expended in per-
manent improvements, the amount and market value of its
bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original
cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the
property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and
the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters
for consideration, and -are to be given such weight as may be
just and right in each ease. We do not say that there may not
be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the
property. What the company is entitled to ask is a fair re-
turn upon the value of that which it employs for the public
convenience."
The inconsistencies in the tests of Smyth v. Ames, however, have
several times been pointed out,40 and the view now adopted by the
United States Supreme Court, while originating in the inconsis-
tencies of Smyth v. Amies, is that the present value of the plant is
the value upon which the utility must be allowed to earn a fair
return.4 ' That is to say, "original cost, reproduction cost," etc.,
when considered, are to be considered only as a means of arriving
at the present value, the proper basic value for purposes of rate
regulation. Thus, as stated by Mr. Justice Hughes in the recent
Minnesota Rate Cases :42
"The cost-of-reproduction method is of service in ascer-
taining the present value of the plant, when it is reasonably
applied and when the cost of reproducing the property
may be ascertained with a proper degree of certainty. "4
39 169 U. S. 466.
'0 See BE -A & WYm, op. cit., § 968, (foot-note).
See authorities cited in note 32, supra.
' 230 U. S. 352, 452.
Italics ours.
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Hence, since the prevailing view is that present value alone is
the value upon which the utility is entitled to base its rates; also,
since that is the view of the United States Supreme Court, and
since all cases of rate regulation (i. e., regulation by statute or com-
mission) may ultimately come before the United States Supreme
Court on the ground that the regulation is confiscatory and there-
fore violative of the Federal Constitution,4 4 present value alone
is the value herein adopted (without discussion as to merit) as the
proper basic value for purposes of rate regulation. Upon this
point Mr. Justice Swayze in one of the leading cases on this ques-
tion 45 makes the following important observation:
"We are met with difficulties and valid objections whether
we adopt the standard of actual investment, of cost of repro-.
duction, or present value. It would be a waste of time for us
to go over this discussion. We think it enough to say that
the great weight of authority is in favor of the standard of
present value. That standard has the sanction of the United
States Supreme Court in cases involving the constitutional
rights of the companies, and is said by that court to be no
longer open to dispute under the Constitution. San Diego
Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439, 442, 23 Sup. Ct.
571, 47 L. Ed. 892. Since all cases of the kind may come be-
fore that tribunal for final adjudication, and its decisions
upon the constitutional question would be binding upon us, we
ought to adopt the same rule."
It is not proper, therefore, considering the purpose and scope of
this article, to go further into the question as to what is the proper
basic value, but the point, which it is both proper and important
to emphasize, is that in determining whether, when or to what
extent going value is an element of capital value it would seem to
be an absolutely indispensible prerequisite to settle upon some
definite basic value as the proper value for rate-making purposes;
for whether, when or to what extent going value is value for rate-
making purposes depends entirely upon the basic value adopted.
Hence, unless otherwise indicated, all that is said in this article is
said upon the assumption that the basic value is the actual present
value of the plant.
The second question raised in the ease of In re West Virginia
Traction & Electric Company, supra, is whether there should be
" See authorities cited in note 32, supra.
4Public Service Gas Co. v. Board of Commissioners. 84 N. J. L. 463, 897 At. 651.
Italics ours
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a separate sum allowed for going value or whether it is sufficient
simply to allow an indefinite "something." The commission there
states that it is allowing "something for going value," and that
"in fixing the value of many of the items constituting said plant
the fact that the same was a going concern was taken into consid-
ration and due allowance made therefor."'4  But there is nothing
in the case to show whether the "due allowance" was one dollar
or one hundred thousand dollars. This method of making an al-
lowance for going value is sanctioned by many authorities ;47 but,
with great deference, it is submitted that the method above adopted
is subject to two valid objections. First, since going value is a
property right upon which a public utility "has a right to make
a fair return,' 48 it is unconstitutional to prevent the utility'by
rate regulation from earning a fair return upon the present value
of its property, including the value of that "property right"
called "going value." But, if only an indefinite something is al-
lowed, how can an appellate court, in passing upon the constitu-
tionality of the rate regulation, determine with a proper degree of
certainty whether a sufficient amount has been allowed for going
value to prevent the rate from being confiscatory? Thus, since it
it constitutional by rate regulation to reduce rates to a point where
the utility may still realize a reasonable return upon the present
value of the plant, but unconstitutional to reduce rates below that
point, it. may well be that a given rate regulation would be un-
constitutional if the amount allowed for going value was $100,
but constitutional if the amount allowed was $100,000. But where
only an indefinite something is allowed it would be practically
impossible in many cases for an appellate court to determine
whether the amount allowed was $100 or $100,000, and hence, to
say the least, very difficult in many cases to determine whether the
rate regulation was constitutional, and impossible in practically
all cases to determine whether this "property right" was given a
proper value.
Some courts and commissions refuse to make a separate allow-
ance, mainly on the ground of the difficulty in ascertaining the
amount at which the value should be estimated. Other authori-
ties, mainly on the same ground, refuse to make any allowance
U Italics ours.
,T See authorities cited in note 8, supra.
48 Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra. Italics ours.
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whatever. But, as was well said in one of the leading cases,4 9
"if 'going value' is capable of ascertainment it will not do for the
commission vaguely to consider it in fixing the fair rate of return.
...... The difficulty of determining 'going value' will not
justify the disregarding of it. Rate making is difficult. But that
will not' justify confiscation. The difficulty, however, will lessen,
as it does in most cases, when we cease to think about the sub-
ject vaguely." The court thereupon held, and quite properly, it
is submitted, that there should be a separate allowance for going
value.
Another objection to allowing only an indefinite "something"
as a general enhancement of the value of the separate items of
physical property is that such an allowance for going value seems
to proceed upon an erroneous theory as to the nature of going
value. Thus, in the above mentioned case60 where this method of
valuation was adopted (which by the way is the method very com-
monly adopted) the various items of property were valued in the
following manner: "Meters, etc., $29,000;" "machinery, $26,-
000;" "fields and city mains and lines, $234,000," etc., but no sep-
arate valuation of "going value," for, as we are told, "in fixing
the value of many items constituting said plant the fact that same
was a going concern was taken into consideration and due allow-
ance made therefor." It will be seen that this method of allow-
ing for going value gives a "going" value to separate "static"
items of property, e. g., meters, mains, machinery, land, etc.;
but how can that be, for it is of the very essence of going value
that it is a value attaching because the thing is a "going" thing
as distinguished from a "static" thing? Moreover, the "thing"
which has a "going" value must be the "plant as a whole" and
not any separate part of the plant, or separate "items constitut-
ing a part of the plant;" for, to quote the language of the United
States Supreme Court in the Knoxville case, 51 going value is the
"added value of the plant as a whole, over the sum of the values
of its component parts, which is attached to it because it is in
actual and successful operation and earning a return." Hence,
since going value is the "added value of the plant as a whole over
the sum of the values of its component parts," it cannot possibly
be a value attaching to a component part so as to enhance the value
' People v. Willcox, 210 N. Y. 479, 104 N. E. 911. Italics ours.
SO In re The West Virginia Traction & Electric Co., supra.
51 Knoxville v. Knoxville water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 9. Italics ours.
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of any particular component part or item as distinguished from
other component parts or items. It would seem, therefore, that a
separate value should be allowed for going value, 52 and that cases
which purport to allow for going value by simply enhancing the
value of some items of property constituting the plant proceed,
prima facie at least, upon an erroneous theory as to the funda-
mental nature of going value. In fact it is believed that almost
the whole conflict and confusion on the question of going value
is due fundamentally to a failure to analyze the "elusive, intangi-
ble and troublesome thing called going value" and to see just ex-
actly what it amounts to in the particular case in question."3
Finally, a word should be said as to the method of estimating
the value of this "elusive" item of property. Many courts and
commissions, as already seen, estimate its value upon the basis
of past losses. With such authorities going value seems to be
simply a capitalization of previously accumulated deficits; hence,
if no deficits, no going value. But for reasons already mentioned
this method of appraisal would seem to be improper; for, to re-
capitulate, it proceeds, prima facie at least, upon an erroneous
theory as to the fundamental nature of going value, and allows
capital value to be wiped out by subsequent earnings. Several
more or less workable methods of appraisal have been advocated by
" See In accord cases cited in note 2, supra.
6It may be argued by those opposed to the "separate-allowance" doctrine that
the latest decision ou the question by the United States Supreme Court does not
hold that there should be a separate allowance. Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des
Moines, supra. The answer, however, is that the case neither holds that there
should be a separate allowance, nor does it hold that it is proper to make an al-
lowance merely by way of a general enhancement. The facts seem to have been
these. The case had been referred to a special Master in Chancery to report his
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Master found the "going value" to be
$300.000, and was at first disposed to allow that amount as a separate sum, but
subsequently decided to make no separate allowance. The Master, however, stated
that the plant was valued on the basis of a plant in actual and successful operation,
otherwise, as he said, its valuet would be much less. And on this point the Supreme
Court simply held that "in view of the facts found and the method of valuation
used by" the Master, the court could not say that the Master did not "sufficiently
Include this element [of value] in determining the value of the property of this
company for rate-making purposes." That is to say, the court would not under
the facts of the case reverse because of the method of valuation adopted, but the
case is far from holding that a proper method was adopted. In fact a mere reading
of the case would seem to show not only that It would have been more satisfactory
In that case if the Master had allowed a separate sum, but also that if he had
allowed the $300,000 as a separate sum, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly
have upheld the separate allowance. The Supreme Court, in fact, had previously
upheld a separate allowance for going value in a municipal purchase case, City of
Omaha v. Omaha Water Co.. 218 U. S. 180, and apparently also in one rate case,
Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 9. On the latter point see, Des
Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra, at p. 168.
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different authorities,51 but it would seem that, on the whole, the
most satisfactory method is a modified form of the method ap-
proved by the New York Court of Appeals in the leading case of
People v. Willcox. 5  There, to outline the method by using the
language of the court, an expert "witness estimated the going
value to be $781,916. He explained at length how he arrived at
that figure. He assumed the existence of two plants situated ex-
actly alike in the same community and with the same physical
property: (1) The actual plant with its established business;
(2) a suppositional plant with no business. He then estimated
the length of time and expense required by the second plant to
develop its business to the stage and revenue of the actual plant."
This method, however, cannot be accepted without some modi-
fications. In the first place, since a plant if improperly con-
structed, e. g., if constructed too large to meet the reasonable,
probable requirements of the community, may base rates only
upon the value of the plant as it should have been constructed,"6
so the "suppositional plant," should not, as the court there per-
mitted, be a plant "situated exactly like" the existing plant in
the same community and "with the same physical property,"
but the suppositional plant should be exactly like the existing
plant as the existing plant should have been constructed. An es-
timate should then be made, based upon the length of time and
expense that under the circumstances would probably and prop-
erly be required by the thus modified suppositional plant to de-
velop its business to the stage and revenue. of the present plant.
This estimate, of course, would include an estimate as to the fair
value of the use of the capital invested during the unproductive
period of development, but would not, of course, include "good-
will" value. It would seem, then, that this estimate would repre-
sent, for rate-making purposes, the reproduction cost of this item
of property called going value, and, hence, in jurisdictions where
reproduction cost is regarded as the proper basis of capital value,
this estimate would represent the "going value for purposes of
rate regulation." It must be remembered, however, that present
value, not reproduction cost, is the constitutional basic value in
eases of rate regulation, i. e., regulation by statute or comifiission, 57
"See I WEITTEN, op. Ct., §637 et 8eq; WYn, op. cit., ch. 12.
210 N. Y. 479, 104 N. E. 911.
- Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Conley, 67 W. Va. 129, 190, 67 S. E. 613. See WYmAN,
op. cit., J§ 1084-1087.
07 See authorities cited in note 32; supra.
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and that the reproduction cost is, to repeat the language of Mr.
Justice Hughes,5 8 only "of service in ascertaining the present
value," that is to say, it is only "eevidence of" the proper value of
the property for rate-making purposes. As to this particular item
of property, however, it would seem that, owing to its peculiar na-
ture, the reproduction cost of the item is on the whole the most
satisfactory .evidence that can be obtained as to its proper basic
value for purposes of rate regulation. Still, of course, the repro-
duction-cost evidence of the value of this item would not neces-
sarily be conclusive evidence as to its present value, for there may
be circumstances under which the cost of reproducing this item
new would differ very materially from its present value. For ex-
ample, suppose that the plant in question is a natural gas plant,
that the natural gas in the community is nearly exhausted and that
its use is rapidly being supplanted by the use of coal and electric-
ity. It would seem that under such circumstances and many other
conceivable circumstances the cost of developing the above-men-
tioned suppositional static plant to the stage and revenue of the
present plant could scarcely be said to represent the present value
of the going-concern part of such a plant. In other words, it
would seem that the going-concern part of a plant (the operating
system), like the physical part of a plant, may become in effect
depreciated, in which case it would not seem to be fair to the pub-
lie to allow the utility to charge rates based upon the reproduction-
cost-new of this item of property. Bearing upon this point may
be mentioned the following observation by the United States Su-
preme Court in a case in which a separate sum for going value was
included in the total valuation of the plant:
"This valuation was determined by the master by ascer-
taining what it would cost, at the date of the ordinance, to
reproduce the existing plant as a new plant. The cost of re-
production is' one way of ascertaining the present value of a
plant [and, it should be remembered, the Supreme Court holds
that the present value of a plant includes going value] . .
but that test would lead to obviously incorrect results, if the cost
of reproduction is not diminished by the depreciation which
has come from age and use." 5
Hence, it would seem that the reproduction cost of this intang-
ible item of property, just as the reproduction cost of physical
51n The Minnesota Rate Cases, supra. Italics ours.
5 Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 9. Italics ours.
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property, should be translated, where circumstances so require,
into the present value of the property. This may seem to be an
unduly complicated and difficult process. "But," as was observed
by the New York court in the passage above quoted, "the diffi-
culty of determining the going value will not justify" confiscation.
Besides, the process of determining the present value of this item
of property after ascertaining the reproduction cost thereof would
not differ from the ordinary process of determining the present
value of physical property after first determining its reproduction-
cost value. It is submitted, therefore, that the above outlined
method of appraisal is not only simple enough to be practical, but,
when properly applied, well adapted to effectuate complete jus-
tice both to the public and to the utility.
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